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Abstract
Payment channel networks (PCNs) have emerged as a promis-
ing alternative to mitigate the scalability issues inherent to
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and are often assumed to im-
prove privacy, as payments are not stored on chain. However,
a systematic analysis of possible deanonymization attacks is
still missing. In this paper, we focus on the Bitcoin Lightning
Network (LN), which is the most widespread implementation
of PCNs to date. We present clustering heuristics that group
Bitcoin addresses, based on their interaction with the LN, and
LN nodes, based on shared naming and hosting information.
We also present cross-layer linking heuristics that can, with
our dataset, link 43.7% of all LN nodes to 26.3% Bitcoin ad-
dresses interacting with the LN. These cross-layer links allow
us to attribute information (e.g., aliases, IP addresses) to 17%
of the Bitcoin addresses contributing to their deanonymiza-
tion. Further, we find the security and privacy of the LN are
at the mercy of as few as five actors that control 34 nodes and
over 44% of the total capacity. Overall, we present the first
quantitative analysis of the security and privacy issues opened
up by cross-layer interactions, demonstrating their impact and
proposing suitable mitigation strategies.
1 Introduction
Payment channel-networks (PCNs) have emerged as a promis-
ing alternative to mitigate the scalability issues with current
cryptocurrencies. These layer-2 protocols, built on-top of
layer-1 blockchains, allow users to perform transactions with-
out storing them on the blockchain. The idea is that two users
create a funding transaction that locks funds (e.g., Bitcoins),
thereby creating a payment channel between them [5]. Fur-
ther payments no longer require on-chain transactions but
rather peer-to-peer mutual agreements on how to distribute
the coins locked in the channel. At any point, both users can
decide to close the channel by creating a settlement transac-
tion that unlocks the coins and distributes them according to
the last agreed balance. Interestingly, two users that do not
share a payment channel between them can route a transaction
through a path of open payment channels.
While there are different payment channel designs, the
Bitcoin Lightning Network (LN) [20] is the most widespread
PCN implementation to date. At the time of writing, according
to 1ml.com, the LN features a network of 7,248 public active
nodes, 36,794 channels and a total capacity of more than
953.06 Bitcoins, worth 8,980,445 USD.
Apart from scalability, PCNs are considered beneficial to
improve the well-known lack of privacy of cryptocurrencies,
where the anonymity claim stemming from the usage of
pseudonyms in on-chain transactions has been largely refuted
from both academia and industry [12]. The key to an effec-
tive deanonymization of Bitcoin pseudonyms lies in heuristic
methods, which cluster addresses that are likely controlled by
the same entity [16]. In practice, entities correspond to user
wallets or software services (e.g., hosted wallet, exchange)
that control private keys on behalf of their users. Depending
on how a Bitcoin user is spending her funds from a software
wallet, she can end up controlling several Bitcoin entities.
As only funding transactions and settlement transactions
used to open and close channels are available on-chain, the
LN is considered one of the technologies that greatly im-
proves privacy. In this work, we refute this belief spread in
the blockchain community by identifying and quantitatively
analyzing the security and privacy leakages affecting the LN
and consequently the privacy of Bitcoin addresses.
Recent research [7, 15, 23, 24] focused mostly on the PCN
layer and showed that Denial of Service attacks targeted to
specific nodes in the LN can effectively block the capacity
at their channels and correspondingly isolate them from the
network. Also, the closely related work by [19] investigated
the links between on-chain transactions and LN channels.
However, we notice the lack of research on how to cluster
LN nodes controlled by the same user as well as how to un-
equivocally link such off-chain nodes with Bitcoin addresses.
This is a challenging task as such links are not provided in
the PCN protocol and they would severely affect the privacy
of node operators.
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Our Contributions. This work presents a systematic privacy
analysis that seeks to better understand the traceability of
cross-layer information by combining data from the Bitcoin
blockchain and the LN. Our methodology is structured in two
main strategies: (i) heuristics to create, on layer 1, clusters
of Bitcoin entities controlled by the same actor, on layer 2,
clusters of off-chain Lightning nodes; and (ii) heuristics to
link these clusters across layers.
Within the first strategy, described in Section 4, we present
four novel on-chain clustering heuristics (star, snake, collec-
tor, proxy), which group Bitcoin addresses based on their
interaction patterns with the LN. With this heuristic, we are
able to cluster 23% of all Bitcoin entities funding a Lightning
channel, and 15% of all entities closing a channel. We also
present a Lightning node clustering heuristic that leverages
public announcements of aliases and IP addresses. We are
able to group 589 nodes into 233 clusters.
Within the second strategy, described in Section 5, we
present two novel linking heuristics. The first exploits the
fact that the same Bitcoin entity can close one channel and
then re-use the coins to open a new channel. In this case, we
are able to link 19.44% of the nodes to 15.16% addresses in
our dataset, when combined with the previous on- and off-
chain clustering heuristics. The second heuristic exploits the
reuse of a single Bitcoin entity for opening several channels to
different nodes. This allows us to link 26.3% of the addresses
to 43.7% of nodes.
We finally assess the impact of our deanonymization tech-
niques on the privacy of Bitcoin entities as well as the security
and privacy of the LN. First, when combining the results from
the aforementioned two strategies, we observe that 17% of the
Bitcoin addresses in our dataset can be attributed with infor-
mation from the LN such as aliases or IP addresses associated
to the linked Lightning nodes. Second, from the LN point
of view, we observe that as few as five entities control 35%
of the capacity in the LN. This centralization of the capacity
has several implications in security and privacy. From the
security point of view, a single entity with high capacity is at
the position to block the capacity of over 40% of the channels
in the LN, affecting over 15% of the capacity. Moreover, this
centralization reduces the burden for targeted denial of service
attacks, allowing high impact even for low budget attackers.
From the privacy point of view, we observe that entities with
high capacity are also highly connected in the LN so that can
potentially stop about 25% of the payments as well as breach
the privacy guarantees for payments routed through a number
of paths between 5% and 40% depending on payment value.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to present a method
for linking Lightning nodes with Bitcoin addresses and to dis-
cuss privacy and security implications. For the reproducibility
of the results, we make our data set and our implementation
openly available at https://github.com/MatteoRomiti/
Lightning-Network-Deanonymization.
2 Background and Problem Statement
In this section, we first present a simplified model of the
Bitcoin blockchain and payment channels in the LN with the
notions and notations relevant for this paper. Then we discuss
and formalize the cross-layer linkage problem, as well as
related work in this area. For further details on PCNs, we
refer the reader to recent surveys [5, 8].
2.1 Bitcoin Blockchain
The Bitcoin blockchain is an immutable, append-only and
publicly available ledger that contains the complete set of
addresses and transactions from the Bitcoin genesis.
A Bitcoin address a is a tuple a := (cash,cond) where
cash is a positive integer that denotes the number of coins (in
Satoshis) associated to this address, and cond is an excerpt of
the Bitcoin script language that denotes the (cryptographic)
conditions under which a can be used in a transaction. Al-
though in principle it is possible that cond encodes any con-
dition that can be expressed in the Bitcoin script language,
in practice most of the addresses share a few conditions: (i)
cond := pk denoting that using this address requires a sig-
nature σ on the transaction verifiable under the public key
pk; (ii) cond := {pk1,pk2} denoting that using this so-called
multisig address requires two signatures {σ1,σ2} verifiable
with pk1 and pk2. We hereby say that an address a is owned
by a user if she can fulfill the condition a.cond on her own.
A Bitcoin wallet is the software used by a Bitcoin user to
handle Bitcoin addresses owned by her. Similar to the notion
of saving and checking accounts in banking, a Bitcoin user is
advised to have (at least) two wallets1: A cold wallet storing
larger sums and a hot wallet with the addresses from where
the user spends more frequently. A hot wallet is expected to
hold a small number of coins and be periodically topped up
from the cold wallet. This separation aims to reduce theft by
hackers and malware possibly available in the computer or
phone that holds the private keys required to spend addresses
in the hot wallet.
A Bitcoin transaction tx is a tuple tx := (txid, Input,
Output, Witness) where txid is the identifier of the trans-
action calculated as the hash of the body of the transaction,
i.e., H(Input,Output); Input denotes the set of addresses set
as input and thus being spent in this transaction, Output is
the set of addresses set as output; and Witness contains the
witness of the transaction allowing to fulfill the conditions
a.cond of each input address a.
Related work has shown that it is possible [16] and effec-
tive [6] to cluster Bitcoin addresses that belong to the same
user. We capture that by defining a Bitcoin entity e as a set
e := {ai} of addresses controlled by the same user as clustered
with the co-spending heuristic.
1https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Cold_storage
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2.2 Payment Channels in Lightning Network
A node n in the Lightning Network (LN) is a tuple n :=
(nid, IP,Alias), where nid is the identifier of the node com-
puted as the hexadecimal representation of a public key from a
digital signature scheme; IP denotes the IP address associated
to the node, and Alias the associated lexical label.
A payment channel c is then created between two nodes
and denoted by the tuple c :=(chpoint,n1,n2), where chpoint
denotes the channel’s endpoint that is set to the identifier
tx.txid of the funding transaction tx that created the channel.
As the transaction may have several outputs, chpoint also
contains the output index of the multisig address that locks
the funds in the channel (e.g., chpoint:choutindex); while n1
and n2 are the nodes of the channel.
A Lightning wallet is the software used by a Lightning
user to manage her node, as well as the channels of this node.
In practice, a Lightning wallet comes with an integrated Bit-
coin (hot) wallet to open and close channels in the LN. Recent
releases of two Lightning wallet implementations (lnd and c-
lightning) [2, 26] enable opening and closing a channel using
an external Bitcoin wallet.
2.3 Cross-Layer Interaction
A payment channel enables multiple Bitcoin transactions be-
tween two users without adding each of them to the Bitcoin
blockchain. The interaction between the blockchain and the
Lightning Network is illustrated in Figure 1 and works as
follows: assume that Alice has a cold Bitcoin wallet with
coins in address a1 and she wants to open a payment channel
with Bob. Moreover, assume that Alice has a Lightning wallet
that handles a4. In this setting, the lifetime of the payment
channel between Alice and Bob is divided into the following
phases:
Replenishment. Alice first transfers coins from her entity e1
(a1, a2, a3) to her second entity e2 (a4), to top up the Lightning
wallet from the Bitcoin cold wallet. We call e1 the source
entity as it is used as the source of funds to be later used in
the LN.
Funding. Alice can now open a channel with Bob by first
computing a deposit address aC1 such that aC1.cash := x1
and aC1.cond := {pk′A,pkB}, where x1 is fewer than the
coins received at a4 in the previous step and cond re-
flects that ownership of aC1 is shared between Alice and
Bob. Second, Alice creates a funding transaction txF1
where txF1.Input := a4,2 txF1.Output := aC1, txF1.txid :=
H(txF1.Input, txF1.Output) and txF1.Witness := σA, where
σA is a digital signature on txF1.txid verifiable under pkA. Af-
ter the transaction txF1 appears on the Bitcoin blockchain,
2Although theoretically a payment channel can be dual-funded (i.e., Bob
also contributes x1 to the funding transaction), this feature is under discus-
sion in the community [1] and currently only single-funded channels are
implemented in practice.
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Figure 1: Life cycle of a Lightning channel. At layer 1, a
source entity e1 tops up entity e2 that is then used in txF1
as funding entity of the channel c1 represented by multisig
address aC1. The channel c1, referenced by a channel point
at layer 2, is established between the nodes n1 and n2. The
channel c1 is then closed with the settlement transaction txS
sending the funds back to two settlement entities, e2 and e3.
The former, e2, reuses these coins in txF2 to fund another
channel (c2) between n2 and n3 represented at layer 1 by
the multisig address aC2. The coins in the other settlement
entity, e3, are instead collected into a destination entity e4, not
directly involved in the LN.
the payment channel c1 between Alice and Bob is effectively
open. The channel c1 is then represented in the payment chan-
nel system as the tuple (c1.chpoint,n1,n2), where n1 and n2
are (possibly new) nodes belonging to Alice and Bob.
Payment. After the channel c1 is open, during the pay-
ment phase, both Alice and Bob can pay each other by ex-
changing authenticated transactions in a peer-to-peer man-
ner authorizing the updates of the balance in the channel.
Following our example, let’s assume that Alice wants to
use channel c1 with Bob to pay α < x1 to his address.
To do so, they create a settlement transaction txS where
txS.Input := aC1, txS.Output := {a4,a5} so that a4 belongs to
Alice, a5 belongs to Bob, txS.tx := H(txS.Input, txS.Output),
and txS.Witness := {σA,σB}, where both σA and σB are sig-
natures on txS.tx verifiable by the public keys included in
aC1.cond.
The cornerstone of payment channels is that Alice and Bob
do not publish the settlement transaction txS in the Bitcoin
blockchain. Instead, they keep it in their memory (i.e., off-
chain) and locally update the balances in their channel c1.
Both Alice and Bob can repeat this process several times to
pay each other.
Settlement. When the channel is no longer needed, Alice
and Bob can close the channel by submitting the last agreed
settlement transaction into the Bitcoin blockchain, thereby
unlocking the coins from aC1 into two Bitcoin addresses, each
belonging to one of them with a number of coins equal to the
last balance they agreed off-chain. In practice, the settlement
transaction may have more than two outputs: Alice can pay
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Bob to a third address where Bob needs to provide cond as
input data other than a signature to redeem the coins (e.g.,
the valid preimage of a hash value before a certain timeout as
defined in the Hash-Time Lock Contract3).
Collection. After the settlement transaction appears in the
Bitcoin blockchain, Bob gets the coins in his Lightning wallet.
As a final step, Bob might want to get his coins into a different
Bitcoin wallet of his own (e.g., cold wallet). For that, Bob
performs a transaction that transfers funds from a5 to a6,
which we call destination address.
We note several points here. First, the addresses in-
volved in the lifetime of payment channels could have
been clustered into entities. In such case, we refer to the
source/funding/settlement/destination entity involved in the
steps instead of the particular address itself. In our example,
Alice owns entity e1 that controls (among others) a1 and we
thus say that entity e1 is the source entity in the replenishment
step. Second, the same entity can be used at the same time for
settlement and funding. Finally, Alice gets the coins from the
channel with Bob in entity e2 that is then reused later to open
a new payment channel.
2.4 The Cross-Layer Linking Problem
A starting point, as shown in Figure 1, is to identify the fund-
ing transaction txF1 corresponding to the payment channel
c1 := (chpoint,n1,n2), by finding the transaction (and the out-
put index) that fulfills the condition txF1.txid = c1.chpoint.
But we cannot assert that the entity e2 in txF1.Input also con-
trols n1, as it could also be that e2 controls n2. Similarly,
while we can deterministically get the settlement transaction
txS used to close the channel c1, we cannot unambiguously
link each settlement entity to the corresponding node.
The goal of this work is two-fold: (i) cluster Lightning
nodes on the LN (layer 2) as well as Bitcoin entities (layer
1); and (ii) unambiguously link sets of Lightning nodes to
the sets of Bitcoin entities that control them. Technically, this
corresponds to finding a function that takes a set of Lightning
channels as input and returns tuples of the form (entity, node)
for which it can be asserted that the Lightning node is con-
trolled by the Bitcoin entity linked to it. We state our problem
a bit more formally in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Cross-Layer Linking Algorithm) Let C be
the set of channels in the LN. Let E be the set of Bitcoin
entities and let N be the set of nodes in the LN. Let P (C ) be
the power set of C , let P (E) be the power set of E and let
P (E ×N ) be the power set of the cross product E ×N .
A linking algorithm is an implementation of a function
P (C )×P (E)→ P (E ×N ). Each tuple (e, n) ∈ P (E ×N )
denotes that the entity e controls the node n.
3https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Hash_Time_Locked_Contracts
2.5 Related Work
On-Chain Clustering and Linking. Several address cluster-
ing heuristics have been proposed for Bitcoin, the safest, most
effective, and most studied one being the previously men-
tioned co-spending heuristic [16, 21], also known as multiple-
input or common-input-ownership heuristic. It assumes that
if two addresses (i.e. a1 and a2) are used as inputs in the same
transaction while one of these addresses along with another
address (i.e. a2 and a3) are used as inputs in another transac-
tion, then the three addresses (a1,a2,a3) are likely controlled
by the same actor.
Recent studies investigated linking in privacy-centric cur-
rencies such as Monero [18] or Zcash [10], in account-model
currencies such as Ethereum [25] and also in the Ripple net-
work [17]. However, all these methods rely on on-chain trans-
actional evidence and do not take into account off-chain data.
Off-Chain Payment Channel Analysis. Single-layer secu-
rity attacks on the LN topology were the focus of many recent
studies: Rohrer et al. [23] measured the LN topology and
found that the LN is highly centralized. An attacker who
can remove a certain number of nodes (e.g., through a DoS
attack) should focus on nodes the with highest centrality, an at-
tacker with limited resources should target the highest-ranked
minimum cut set, which is the set of edges with minimal ac-
cumulated capacity that, when removed, partitions the graph.
Similarly, Seres et al. [24] found that the LN provides topolog-
ical stability under random failures, but is structurally weak
against rational adversaries targeting network hubs. Also, Mar-
tinazzi and Flori [15] have shown that the LN is resilient
against random attacks, but very exposed to targeted attacks,
e.g., against central players. Lin et al. [7] inspected the re-
silience of the LN and showed that removing hubs leads to the
collapse of the network into many components, an evidence
suggesting that this network may be a target for the so-called
split attacks.
Single-layer privacy in the LN has recently been studied
by Kappos et al. [11], who focused on balance discovery and
showed that an attacker running an active attack can easily in-
fer the balance by running nodes and sending forged payments
to target nodes. When combined with network snapshots, an
attacker can discover all balances in the network.
Nowostawski and Ton [19] conducted an initial cross-layer
analysis and investigated footprints of the LN on the public
Bitcoin blockchain. They linked channels with their corre-
sponding funding transactions. Our work instead investigates
the link between Lightning nodes and Bitcoin entities and the
associated security and privacy implications.
In summary, we can state that most existing studies consider
active, single-layer attacks on either the LN or the blockchain,
however, no study has yet investigated the linkage of Bitcoin
entities with Lightning nodes based on publicly available
information, which is the focus of this paper.
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3 Dataset
For our analysis we rely on off-chain (LN) as well as on-chain
data (Bitcoin blockchain).
3.1 Off-chain Data: LN
We used the LN Daemon (LND) software and captured a
copy of the LN topology at regular intervals (30 min) via the
describegraph command since May 21 2019. The off-chain
part of our dataset contains 70,783 channels, 37,280 of which
were still open on March 3, 2020. The most recent channel
in our dataset was opened on February 24, 2020, while the
oldest was opened on January 12, 2018. We stored each chan-
nel between two nodes as a tuple (chpoint,n1,n2,cap), where
chpoint denotes the channel identifier, and the pair n1, n2 de-
notes the nodes sharing the channel, as described in Section 2.
Additionally, we store the capacity of the channel in cap. Our
dataset does not contain the balance of each node because this
information is kept private at the nodes themselves. We also
define the activity period of a node as the time that starts with
the funding transaction that opened the first public channel in
which the node appeared and ends either with the settlement
transaction of its last public channel or with 2020-05-18 (the
time of preparing the dataset), if the nodes had still public
channels open.
These channels were established between 8,267 distinct
nodes, each of which we stored as a tuple (nid, IP,Alias),
where nid denotes a node identifier as described in Section 2.
If available, IP refers to the publicly announced IP or Tor
address of a node, and Alias to the human-readable alias as-
signed by the node operator.
3.2 On-chain Data: Bitcoin Blockchain
First, for each channel in our off-chain dataset, we used the
transaction hash included in the channel’s field chpoint for
retrieving the funding transaction. Next, we checked whether
the coins sent to the multisig address were spent or not. If a
coin was spent, we fetched the settlement transaction, that
uses that multisig address as input. We obtained this data by
querying the GraphSense API4 and the Blockstream API5. We
thereby extracted 70,782 funding transactions6 and 33,503
settlement transactions.
Next, we extracted the input addresses of all funding trans-
actions and the output addresses of all settlement transac-
tions and mapped them to funding and settlement entities, as
defined in Section 2.1. Before clustering entities, we used
BlockSci [9] to filter CoinJoin transactions because they
would merge addresses of unrelated users. In addition, we
4https://api.graphsense.info/
5https://github.com/Blockstream/esplora/blob/master/API.
md
6Two channels were opened with one funding transaction.
Table 1: On-chain Dataset Summary.
Source Funding Settlement Destination
# Addr 117,800 46,782
# Entities 130,828 69,501 28,088 25,014
# Addr (Exp.) 57,245,617 128,421 80,795 63,742,876
# Services 2,515 2 32 251
# Relations 134,477 31,619
made sure that no CoinJoins from Wasabi or Samourai7 wal-
lets were in our dataset. On the funding side, we also extracted
the source entities that were sending coins to funding entities;
on the settlement side, we retrieved destination entities that
received coins from settlement entities. For that purpose, we
implemented a dedicated data extraction and analytics job
for the GraphSense Platform and executed it on a snapshot
of the Bitcoin blockchain up to block 618,857 (2020-02-25
00:59), amounting for a total of 506,395,375 transactions and
616,401,800 addresses clustered into 298,406,250 entities.
After having extracted the Bitcoin entities that were in-
volved in opening and closing payment channels, we at-
tributed them using the Chainalysis API8 and assigned service
categories (e.g., exchange, hosted wallet) to entities.
Table 1 summarizes the number of addresses (# Addr)
found in funding and settlement transactions as well as the
number of resulting entities after applying the co-spending
heuristics on these addresses (# Entities). We can clearly ob-
serve that the number of distinct source entities (130,828)
is higher than the number of destination entities (25,014),
which is also reflected in the number of relations (# Relations)
representing monetary flows from source to funding entities
and from settlement to destination entities, respectively. We
think these unbalanced numbers are due to many channels
still open.
Since the co-spending heuristic also groups addresses
which were not part of our dataset snapshot, we also added
the number of expanded addresses (# Addr (Exp.)). The differ-
ence between the number of addresses and entities on both the
source and destination side can be explained by the presence
of super-clusters, which are responsible for large transaction
inputs and outputs and typically represent service entities
such as cryptocurrency exchanges [6].
Finally, this table also lists the number of identified service
entities (# Services). This is generally low (< 2%), reflecting
that non-custodial, possibly hosted wallets (we identified 34)
are used when opening and closing channels. Roughly 2% of
all source entities were categorized, with the majority (1,8%)
being exchanges. On the settlement side, we identified 1% of
all destination entities as wallets being controlled by services,
again the majority (0,6%) being exchanges. We also briefly
examined one-hop-out data from the sources and destinations
7https://github.com/nopara73/WasabiVsSamourai
8https://www.chainalysis.com/
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and found a similar picture: a fairly large fraction of entities
is uncategorized, with most of the others being exchanges.
4 Single-Layer Clustering
In this section, we present clustering heuristics that can group
Lightning nodes based on public announcements of aliases
and IP addresses (Section 4.1) and Bitcoin entities based
on their interaction with the LN (Section 4.2). A challenge,
which has also been pointed out in previous works on cluster-
ing heuristics (see Section 2.5), lies in the lack of ground-truth
data available for quantifying their effectiveness. Acknowl-
edging this issue, we discuss each heuristic in terms of possi-
ble false positives and identify countermeasures.
4.1 Off-Chain Lightning Node Clustering
The operator of a Lightning node can announce custom node
features such as an alias, which was added to the LN to im-
prove the usability of the system. The alias can be changed
by the operator at any time without affecting the operation
of open channels, as those are only tied to a node’s private
and public key pair. We observed that when a user is op-
erating multiple nodes, it is likely that she will name her
nodes in a similar fashion, or along a common theme. For ex-
ample, the operator LNBIG.com enumerates its nodes on
their website9, with aliases such as LNBIG.com [lnd-25],
LNBIG.com [lnd-34]. Via public chat, the developers con-
firmed that LNBIG.com Billing also belongs to them. Strong
alias similarities are most likely intentional, for example, to
make it easier for users to identify a service, or the operators
may want to use it to achieve a reputation or branding effect.
In order to find nodes under the control of the same entity,
we can exploit the alias information and measure similarity.
We evaluated popular string similarity metrics (cf. [4]) such
as the Levenshtein, Hamming and Jaro-Winkler distances.
Naturally, however, aliases can be similar, but not belong
to the same entity. Examples include node aliases such as
WilderLightning and GopherLightning, which overlap textu-
ally but are not controlled by the same entity.
Apart from the alias, nodes advertise their IP address (or an
address within the Tor network) and a port. We can use this
additional public information to filter the clusters obtained
through alias similarity, increasing the confidence that the
nodes are operated by the same entity.
Each IP address is part of a Classless Inter-Domain Routing
(CIDR) [3] prefix that is under the control of one or multiple
network operators. An Internet Service Provider (ISP) may
operate a collection of such CIDRs, and their grouping is
called autonomous system (AS), each of which is identified
by an autonomous system number (ASN). By performing
WHOIS queries, we can obtain the ASN’s of each Lightning
9https://lnbig.com/#/our-nodes
node IP address. If an alias-based node cluster consists only
of IP addresses associated to a single ASN, we conclude that
the Lightning nodes are hosted by the same network operator
and is, therefore, more likely operated by a single entity. In
addition, we also cluster Lightning nodes that are (or have
been in the past) reachable via the same IP or Tor address.
Technically, we first determine pairwise alias distances
by computing a distance matrix between all lightning node
aliases using different distance metrics. Then we perform
agglomerative hierarchical clustering to avoid early cluster
merging due to single aliases being similar to two distinct clus-
ters. For threshold identification, we evaluate the full range
of thresholds by counting the number of lightning nodes that
remain when pruning clusters that are not pure with respect
to their ASNs. We then choose the threshold that results in
the largest number of clustered nodes, while ensuring the
LNBIG.com cluster is identified as a single cluster of at least
26 nodes, as we have ground truth from their website. In paral-
lel, we perform IP-based clustering by grouping all lightning
nodes that have been seen to be reachable via the same IP or
Tor address. Finally, we join alias and IP-based clustering
and merge the resulting alias and IP-based clusters if there is
an overlap. This results in the final off-chain-based lightning
node clusters.
In our analysis, we considered all nodes with their history of
aliases and valid addresses. IPs within address ranges reserved
for special purposes such as private networks are excluded.
We compared the performance of ten different string distance
measures (see Appendix B) and concluded that the relative
longest common substring measure yields the best results.
In particular, 314 lightning nodes have been grouped into
115 clusters. The IP-based clustering yields 466 clustered
lightning nodes, 185 of which are already part of the alias-
based clusters. By merging these clusters, the final cluster
count is 233, with a total of 589 lightning nodes clustered.
The two largest clusters are *lnd-gar-nodl-it (42 nodes) and
LNBIG.com (26 nodes).
Discussion. Alias/ASN and IP-based clustering can yield
some false positives. For example, if two nodes have very
similar aliases, and are coincidentally hosted on the same AS,
they would be recognized as one entity. This could happen
with LN-specific hosting services or widespread services such
as Amazon. In general, however, filtering alias clusters to
those running on the same AS should result in fewer false
positives. For the entity LNBig.com, we had ground truth
which we used to optimize the alias similarity threshold. By
reaching out to one operator, we were able to validate one
cluster of lightning nodes. For privacy reasons, we refrain
from naming the operator.
Countermeasures. While the use of aliases supports the
usability of the system, the way some users choose them
clearly hinders their privacy. For more privacy, aliases should
be sufficiently different from one another. While the pub-
lic announcement of IP addresses may be unavoidable for
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those nodes that wish to have incoming channels in the LN,
linkability across nodes of the same user can be mitigated
if the clients for each node are hosted with different service
providers (and thus ASNs and IP addresses).
4.2 On-Chain Bitcoin Entity Clustering
LN-blockchain interactions are reflected in the Bitcoin entity
graph (see Section 2): opening a channel causes a monetary
flow (relation) from a source entity to a funding entity; closing
a channel causes a flow from a settlement entity to a destina-
tion entity. When inspecting the resulting graph abstractions,
we observed four patterns (see Appendix A) that inform our
heuristics.
First, several funding entities received funds from the same
source entities. Looking at the interaction graph among enti-
ties, this forms a star-shaped pattern with one source entity
transferring coins to several funding entities. This reflects a
current requirement in the Lightning wallet10, which requires
users to transfer funds from an external wallet (source en-
tity) to an internal wallet (funding entity) before opening a
channel. Under the assumption that the source entities do not
represent services like an exchange, which occurs less than
1% (see Section 3), we can assume that the receiving funding
entities in this pattern are likely controlled by the same user
who funded several channels using the same external wallet.
Second, again on the funding side, we observed a snake-like
pattern in which source entities transfer coins to a funding
entity, which then opens a channel and the change from the
funding transaction is used to fund another channel, and so on
(analogous to the well-known Bitcoin Change-Heuristic [16]).
We assume that the funding entities in this pattern are likely
controlled by the same user.
Third, we identified a so-called collector pattern, which
mirrors the previously described star pattern on the settlement
side: a user forwards funds from several settlement entities,
which hold the unlocked coins of closed channels in an in-
ternal wallet, to the same destination entity, which serves as
an external collector wallet of funds and therefore fulfills a
convenience function for the user.
Fourth, we also found a refined version of the collector
pattern, which we call proxy pattern: a user first aggregates
funds from several settlement transactions in a single settle-
ment entity and then forwards them to a single destination
entity. Again, we can assume that all settlement entities and
the proxy entities are controlled by the same user.
Based on these observations we can define four heuristics,
which are computed as follows: first, we construct 1-hop ego-
networks for the funding and settlement entities. We thereby
extract funding relations connecting source and funding enti-
ties, as well as settlement relations connecting settlement and
destination entities (see Section 3). In these ego-networks, the
10We note that this requirement may no longer be there if the functionality
available in the recent release [26] is widely adopted among Lightning users
Table 2: On-chain clustering results.
Star (F) Snake (F) Collector (S) Proxy (S)
# Components 32 (<1%) 4,910 (32%) 875 (15%) 539 (9%)
# Entities 84 (<1%) 16,051 (23%) 2,289 (8%) 1,734 (6%)
# Addresses 87 (<1%) 16,077 (13%) 3,839 (5%) 7,657 (9%)
entities are represented as nodes and monetary flows as edges
between entities.
Next, we compute all strongly-connected components in
these graphs and filter them by the following conditions:
• Star Heuristic (Funding): if a component contains one
source entity that forwards funds to one or more funding
entities, then these funding entities are likely controlled by
the same user.
• Snake Heuristic (Funding): if a component contains one
source entity that forwards funds to one or more entities,
which themselves are used as source and funding entities,
then all these entities are likely controlled by the same user.
• Collector Heuristic (Settlement): if a component con-
tains one destination entity that receives funds from one or
more settlement entities, then these settlement entities are
likely controlled by the same user.
• Proxy Heuristic (Settlement): if a component contains
one destination entity that receives funds from one or more
entities, which themselves are used as settlement and desti-
nation entities, then these entities are likely controlled by the
same user.
Table 2 shows the number of Bitcoin entities we were able
to cluster with each heuristic. When regarding the connected
components, we can clearly see the rare occurrence of the
star patterns and the dominance of the snake pattern, which
represents 32% of all funding components. On the settlement
side, 24% of all components either match the collector or
the proxy pattern. Consequently, we were able to group 23%
(16,135) of all funding entities and 14% (4,023) of all settle-
ment entities. This corresponds to 16,164 funding addresses
and 11,496 settlement addresses.
Discussion. Our heuristic can, by definition, also yield false
positives for two main reasons: first, an entity could represent
several users if clustered addresses are controlled by a service
(e.g., exchange) on behalf of their users (custodial wallet) or
if transactions of several unrelated users are combined in a
CoinJoin transaction. Second, users could transfer ownership
of Bitcoin wallets off-chain, e.g., by passing a paper wallet.
While the second case is hard to filter automatically, we ap-
plied countermeasures to the first case: first, we filtered known
CoinJoin transactions (see Section 3), and second, we filtered
all components containing service entities by using one of the
most comprehensive attribution dataset available.
Countermeasures. We suspect that the above patterns re-
flect a user behavior that is already known to compromise
the privacy of transactions: reuse of addresses. If outputs of
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funding transactions are not reused for opening other chan-
nels, the snake heuristic would not work; if users refrain from
funding channels from a single external source and avoid col-
lecting funds in a single external destination entity, the other
heuristics would not yield any significant results.
5 Cross-Layer Linking: Lightning Nodes and
Bitcoin Entities
In this section, we present two algorithms that link Lightning
nodes to the Bitcoin entities that control them. In both of
these heuristics, we do not consider settlement transactions
with more than two output entities (1.7% of the settlement
transactions), as they are not a cooperative close and do not
allow us to unambiguously link nodes and output entities. An
assumption that we make in both of the following linking
algorithms is that if one node in a channel has been linked
to a settlement entity and the settlement transaction has two
output entities, then the other node can be linked to the other
settlement entity.
5.1 Linking Algorithm 1: Coin Reuse
Although a payment channel may remain open during the
whole lifetime of the LN, payment channels are often closed
in practice so that the two users of the closed channel get back
their coins in their corresponding Bitcoin addresses. Among
other reasons, the users may close a channel because it is
depleted (i.e., all the balance in the channel is with one user)
or simply because they no longer find economic incentive in
keeping their coins locked at the channel to transact between
each other. After a channel is closed and the two users get
their corresponding coins back, they can open new payment
channels with other users that better represent their updated
business relations.
Our linking algorithm builds upon this usage pattern. An il-
lustrative example of this linking algorithm is included in Fig-
ure 1 where a funding entity e2 has been used to open a
channel c1 between nodes n1 and n2 with the funding transac-
tion txF1. Later, this channel has been closed in the settlement
transaction txS, releasing the coins in the channel to the enti-
ties e2 (i.e., the same that was used as input in txF1) and e3.
Finally, assume that the owner of entity e2 decides to open
a new channel reusing the coins from txS performing a new
funding transaction txF2 which results in the payment channel
c2 between the aforementioned node n2 and the node n3.
In this situation, given that the entity e2 has appeared in the
settlement transaction of c1 and has been reused to open a new
channel in the funding transaction c2, our heuristic concludes
that the entity e1 controls node n1.
Definition 2 (Linking Algorithm: Coin Reuse) Assume
that a Bitcoin entity e opens a Lightning channel
c1 := (chpoint1,n1,n2). If e is used as settlement entity to
close the Lightning channel c1 and also as funding entity to
open a new Lightning channel c2 := (chpoint2,n1,n3), the
user controlling entity e also controls the Lightning node n1
in common to both channels c1 and c2.
We applied the linking algorithm based on coin reuse which
resulted in 43 tuples of (funding transaction, settlement trans-
action, settlement transaction) and 8 entities reusing their
addresses for opening and closing channels. Once these 8
entities are linked to Lightning nodes, all the other output en-
tities in the settlement transactions of these 8 entities can be
linked to the counter-party nodes in the channels as mentioned
earlier. Finally, after these new links are created, our heuristic
can iteratively go over the settlement transactions that involve
these newly linked entities to find other entity-node pairs.
After 7 iterations, the heuristic yielded 4,218 entities linked
to 1,265 nodes, having thus cases where a node is linked
to multiple entities. In total, if we consider the number of
entities we have in our dataset (92,544 overall, both funding
and settlement side11) the heuristic is able to link 4.56% of
them. This result is a lower bound on the possible number of
linked entity-node pairs because the linking algorithm mainly
relies on channels to be closed (in our dataset only half of
them are) and on a specific subset of entities, namely the
output entities of settlement transactions with exactly two
outputs, one per node. In fact, if we focus only on settlement
transactions with two output entities, we have 15,895 entities,
26.54% of which can be linked, showing thereby that this
linking algorithm has a targeted but effective linking effect.
Regarding the nodes percentages, we can link 15.30% of the
total (8,267 overall) and 42.84% of the nodes for which it
has existed at least one channel that has been closed using
a 2-output-entity settlement transaction, confirming thus the
trend we observed with entities.
Discussion. We note that requiring that the same entity is
used for all three transactions (i.e., funding and settlement of
first channel as well as funding of the second channel) may be
too restrictive and leave out further links of entities and nodes.
However, we enforce this restriction to avoid false positives
that could be otherwise introduced as we describe next.
Assume we control a LN node, n2, with an associated Bit-
coin entity e1 that funds channel c1 between node n2 and
n1 through txF1. Furthermore, we have a LN wallet with an
associated Bitcoin entity, e3, on our phone provided by a third-
party app. This means that there must be another node in the
LN, n3, managed by this third-party app. When we decide
to close channel c1, we specify an address provided by our
third-party app, hence belonging to entity e3, as settlement
address to receive the funds back. We finally proceed to use
these funds to open a new channel, c2, again with node n1
but from node n3, the third-party node. Without the require-
ment on the same funding entity, the heuristic would link the
11Here we do not consider source and destination entities as they do not
directly interact with the LN.
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node n1, in common between the two channels, to the entity
e3 reusing the funds, which is false. With the same funding
address requirement, instead, this case is ignored.
A further condition that needs to be satisfied to strengthen
this heuristic is that the nodes not common to the two channels
(nodes n1 and n3 in Figure 1) have a time overlap in their
activity period. This excludes the unlikely, but not impossible
case that one node changes its ID (public key) from n2 to n3
keeping the same Bitcoin wallet (and thus entity), which could
allow one to open two channels from two different nodes, but
to the same node, using the same Bitcoin entity, creating a
false-positive case for the heuristic.
Countermeasures. The default functionality of Lightning
wallets followed thus far by virtually all users consists in hav-
ing a single wallet per node from where to extract the funds to
open channels and where to send the coins after channels con-
nected to such node are closed. We conjecture that this setting
favors the usage pattern leveraged in the linking algorithm
described in this section. As a countermeasure, we advocate
for the support of funding and settlement channels of a single
node from different (external) Bitcoin wallets, helping thus to
diversify the source of funds. We observe that recent versions
of the Lightning wallet lnd and c-lightning have started to
support this functionality [2, 26].
5.2 Linking Algorithm 2: Entity Reuse
Assume that a user, say Alice, has a certain number of coins
in her wallet and she wants to participate in the LN. For
that, she needs to open payment channels with other users by
creating the corresponding funding transactions. In practice,
Alice might have used the same Bitcoin wallet to open all the
channels, which translates in using the same Bitcoin entity
as input for all funding transactions. We leverage this usage
pattern in our second linking algorithm.
In a bit more detail, in this linking algorithm we assume that
an entity e opened several payment channels with other enti-
ties. This common usage pattern in practice can be detected at
the blockchain by finding the set of NC funding transactions
that have e in common as the funding entity. We can thus say
that e has opened NC channels. At the LN, if there is only one
node n common to all the NC channels funded by e, we say
that e controls n.
An illustrative example of this linking algorithm is shown
in Figure 2, where entity e1 funds NC := 3 channels and a
node n1 is common to all those channels. Then we can say
that entity e1 controls n1.
Definition 3 (Linking Algorithm 2) If there are NC chan-
nels opened by one single funding entity e that have only one
Lightning node n in common, then the user controlling entity
e also controls the node n.
The minimum value of Nc that allows us to link entities to
nodes is 2. We can link 4,747 entities to 1,541 nodes which
a
C3
a
C2
a
C1
n
3
n
2
n
4
n
1
e
1
Lightning Network
Bitcoin Entity Graph
ch point
4475e019:0
ch point114341c6:0
ch po
int
ccf04
87b:0
tx
F2
4475e019
txF1 c
cf0487b
tx
F3 114341c6
Layer 2
Layer 1
Figure 2: Linking Algorithm 2: Entity reuse example. At
layer 1, the funding entity e1 is reused to perform NC = 3
funding transactions. At layer 2, the corresponding channels
are opened and there is one node, n1, common to all the NC
channels and it can be linked to the funding entity e1.
correspond to 5.13% of all the entities and 18.64% of all the
nodes respectively.
Discussion. The way this linking algorithm has been de-
scribed and implemented so far might yield false entity-node
links. As discussed in section 5.1, a user can open a channel
from its node n2 to another node n1, then close the channel,
change its node ID to n3 keeping the same Bitcoin wallet and
finally open a second channel to n1. For this linking algorithm,
this example would cause a false positive because n1 would
be linked to the Bitcoin entity of this user. To prevent this
from happening, we add the following condition. Consider
the set of nodes appearing in the channels funded by a single
funding entity e and exclude from this set the node that has
been linked to e with this heuristic. Now, if there is at least
one pair of nodes (n2, n3 from the example above) in this
set that have an activity period overlap, then we discard the
false-positive risk as it is not possible for node n2 to change
to n3 keeping two channels open. When implementing this
additional requirement, we discovered that our results do not
contain any false positive as there is at least one pair of nodes
with an activity period overlap for each entity-node link.
To further validate the results of this second linking algo-
rithm, we checked whether it provides the same entity-node
links as in the linking algorithm presented in Section 5.1. To
do this, we verified that all of the 4,218 entities that appear
in both linking algorithms, are associated to the same nodes.
Countermeasures. A countermeasure to this heuristic is to
not reuse the same funding entity to open multiple channels.
This can be achieved either by having multiple unclustered
addresses in a wallet or to rely on external wallets [2, 26].
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Table 3: Summary results
Linking + Clustering
% addresses
linked
% entities
linked
% nodes
linked
heuristic 1 13.46 4.56 15.30
heuristic 1 + stars 13.46 4.56 15.30
heuristic 1 + snakes 13.48 4.56 15.30
heuristic 1 + proxies 15.14 5.26 17.13
heuristic 1 + all on-chain 15.16 5.26 19.44
heuristic 1 + all on/off-chain 15.16 5.26 17.13
heuristic 2 14.41 5.13 18.64
heuristic 2 + stars 14.45 5.15 18.75
heuristic 2 + snakes 24.55 10.32 39.03
heuristic 2 + proxies 16.09 5.83 20.33
heuristic 2 + all on-chain 26.3 11.04 40.16
heuristic 2 + all on/off-chain 26.3 11.04 43.7
6 Combining Heuristics
In this section, we merge the results of our clustering algo-
rithms (as described in Section 4) and our linking algorithms
(as described in Section 5), thereby increasing the linking
between entities and nodes. In the best case (last entry in Ta-
ble 3) we get to 26.3% of linked addresses and 43.7% of
linked Lightning Network nodes.
The reason why on-chain clustering algorithms should im-
prove the linking algorithms is that they better represent a
user’s behavior, just like the co-spend heuristic does. If we
think about the on-chain patterns that we introduced, they all
group together entities that, based on their interaction with
the LN, are controlled by one single actor.
Table 3 shows the percentage of addresses, entities and
nodes that can be linked together when adding the clustering
algorithms in the linking process. Comparing these results
with the ones from the basic implementation of the linking
algorithms, we notice that the first linking algorithm improves
only by few percentage points, while the second linking algo-
rithm improves roughly by a factor of 2. However, not every
clustering algorithm contributes the same to the overall results.
We discuss each of them next except for the collector pattern,
which, despite being a useful on-chain clustering heuristic,
does not contribute significantly to the linking.
Star-pattern contribution. The behavior that can be mod-
eled when combining the star pattern and the linking algo-
rithms can be described with the following example. A user
owns a cold wallet and additionally controls one LN node n
which runs its own LN wallet. Anytime the LN wallet needs
to be replenished, it generates a different address ai (corre-
sponding to an entity ei of size 1) and the cold wallet sends
coins to it. After this, ei can be used to open a new channel
from the node n. At this point, the node n can be linked to the
star that is formed by the set of entities {ei}.
Unfortunately, this pattern, as reported in Table 2, occurs
less often than the others, a possible reason why it has no
contribution for the linking algorithm 1 and an impact of less
than a percentage point in linking algorithm 2.
Snake-pattern contribution. As already described in Sec-
tion 4.2 the snake pattern follows the concept of reusing the
change address to fund a new channel. Due to the frequent
creation of a change in Bitcoin, this pattern occurs much more
often than the star pattern and the proxy pattern (two and one
order of magnitudes more respectively). This also the reason
why its contribution to the linking is the most significant one
for linking algorithm 2. Unfortunately, it is not so effective
with the linking algorithm 1, probably because the coin-reuse
heuristic is a stricter version of the entity-reuse heuristic.
Proxy-pattern contribution. The proxy pattern models the
behavior of a LN user that decides to merge the coins from
different settlement transactions into one single entity to avoid
keeping track of funds, possibly on different wallets. This pat-
tern seems to have a stable contribution (around 2% for linked
nodes) for both linking algorithms when applied without the
other patterns.
Off-chain node clustering contribution. Assume there is a
cluster of nodes obtained with the heuristic presented in Sec-
tion 4.1 and one of these nodes has been linked to one entity.
At this point, since the nodes in the cluster are supposed to
be controlled by the same LN user, we can indirectly link all
the other nodes in the cluster to the entity. We refer to these
nodes as indirectly-linked nodes. Even though we enforced
strict conditions in the clustering algorithm based on alias/IP
information, we are aware of the fact that this type of linking
may be considered as weaker as it relies on one additional
assumption (nodes in an alias-based cluster are correctly at-
tributed to one actor). In total, for the linking algorithm 1
we find 191 indirectly-linked nodes, which corresponds to an
additional 2.91% of nodes linked, while for the linking algo-
rithm 2 we find 292 indirectly-linked nodes which correspond
to an additional 3.53% of nodes linked.
7 Security and Privacy Implications
In this section, we evaluate the security and privacy implica-
tions of our clustering and linking algorithms in two ways:
(i) privacy impact on Bitcoin entities (Section 7.1) and (ii)
security and privacy impact on the LN (Sections 7.2 to 7.6).
7.1 Privacy Impact on Bitcoin Entities
The linking algorithms and clustering algorithms described in
this work allow attributing activity to Bitcoin entities derived
from their interaction with the LN. Assuming a cluster is
formed by a certain number of Bitcoin entities and Lightning
nodes. If any of the Lightning nodes has publicly identifi-
able information (e.g., alias or IP address), this information
can be attributed to the Bitcoin entities as well. In total, we
can attribute tagging information (aliases or IP addresses)
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to 10,064 different entities that in total account for 26,343
different addresses, which represent 16.9% of our dataset.
This deanonymization is based purely on publicly available
data and can be carried out by a low budget, passive adversary
that simply downloads the Bitcoin blockchain and the infor-
mation from the LN. Moreover, the possible deanonymization
of Bitcoin entities hereby presented shows that it is crucial to
consider the privacy of both layers simultaneously instead of
one of them at a time as largely done so far in the literature.
7.2 Distribution of Wealth and Impact in
Griefing Attacks in LN
In this section, we first evaluate how wealth is distributed
in the LN, that is, how much capacity is controlled by each
of the entities found during our analysis. For that, we take
a recent snapshot of the LN from 2020-02-24 and extract
the capacity controlled by each entity. If a channel has been
created by an entity that has been linked to a node, we can
attribute the full capacity of the channel to that node. For
channels where only one side belongs to a clustered entity, we
attribute the capacity to that entity. For all other channels, we
assume that each entity controls half of the capacity. Under
these assumptions, we observe that the overall capacity of the
LN is distributed as shown in Table 4. In particular, a single
entity controls over 36% of the overall capacity in the LN and
as few as 156 nodes (2.4%) control over 80% of the capacity.
This result refines the previous study in [7] where they find
that 80% of the capacity is controlled by 10% of the nodes.
This result shows that few Lightning entities are in a priv-
ileged situation that they can potentially use to selectively
prevent other Lightning nodes from transacting in the net-
work, for instance, launching a griefing attack [22] against
the victim nodes. In the griefing attack, the attacker finds a
path of the form n1→ n2→ . . .→ nk where n1 and nk belong
to the attacker. Using that path, the attacker routes a payment
from n1 to nk, thereby allocating funds at each channel to
support the payment transfer. However, this payment is never
accepted by nk, forcing the intermediary channels to wait to
release the funds locked for the payment until a certain time-
out expires. In the current LN implementation, this timeout is
in the order of several days.
For this attack to be effective, the attacker needs to per-
form and lock a payment for an amount at least the capacity
available at the channel of the victim. However, as shown
Table 4: Lightning entities controlling most capacity
Entity Node count Share of total capacity contributed
LNBig.com * 26 36.35%
BitRefill.com, ... 2 3.90%
CoinGate 2 2.06%
*rompert.com* 2 0.91%
Breez 2 0.84%
1 2 3 4 5
Top entities
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
S
h
a
re
 l
o
ck
ed
 w
it
h
g
ri
ef
in
g
 a
tt
a
ck
L
N
B
IG
.c
om
 *
B
it
re
fi
ll
.c
om
*,
 .
..
S
y
n
d
ic
at
e 
˜ *
, 
..
.
en
er
g
y
-k
it
ch
en
.*
, 
..
.
*
.b
it
p
ie
.c
om
of all channels
of total capacity
Figure 3: Fraction of all LN channels/capacity vulnerable to
griefing attack launched by each entity.
in Table 4, the uneven distribution of wealth in the LN makes
this a small investment if the attacker is one of the entities with
high capacity. In fact, we evaluated the possible damage that
each entity in the LN can infringe by launching this griefing
attack with the results shown in Figure 3. As expected from
the wealth distribution, the entity with the highest capacity is
the one that can infringe the most devastating attack, being
able to render useless for a period of time over 40% of the
channels in the Lightning Network, which amount for over
15% of the total capacity.
7.3 Vulnerability to DoS attacks in LN
The growing monetary value of the LN and the existence of
competitor business within the network as well as from other
available payment networks open the door for DoS attacks.
In fact, there have already been DoS attacks against the LN
reported. For instance, in March 2018, it was reportedly hit by
a distributed DoS attack that took 20% of the nodes offline12.
In this state of affairs, we study here the effect of DoS attacks
targeted at the Lightning entities found in this work.
Based on the LN snapshot we iteratively remove the nodes
and channels corresponding to a given entity, starting with
the entities that control the most capacity. We then compare
the resulting graph with the original one to evaluate the adver-
sary’s advantage (i.e., attack’s success) attributed to a DoS
targeted to such entity. Following [23], we characterize the
notion of adversary’s advantage as ∆m :=
∣∣∣1− m′m ∣∣∣ where m
is the a priori measurement and m′ is the a posterior one. The
higher ∆m becomes, the higher the success of the attack ac-
cording to the metric m. We consider the three metrics as
defined in [23]: (i) ∆r defined as the number of nodes within
the biggest component in the graph, representing thereby the
12https://www.trustnodes.com/2018/03/21/lightning-
network-ddos-sends-20-nodes
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Figure 4: Adversary’s advantage in doing DoS attacks in LN.
effect on the number of reachable nodes; (ii) ∆ f defined as the
average maximum flow between every two nodes in the graph,
representing thereby the effect of the attack on liquidity; and
(iii) ∆s defined as the payment success ratio, representing
thereby the effect of the attack on the payments. Following
their approach for estimation, we perform a uniform random
sampling of 1000 pairs of nodes to compute ∆ f and ∆s.
We obtain the results shown in Figure 4. We observe that a
possibly low resource adversary that carry out a DoS attack
targeted to a single Lightning entity (26 nodes in total) al-
ready gets an advantage that is only slightly improved when
targeting more entities. As each entity is hosted on a single
autonomous system, it could be sufficient to attack a single
hosting provider. In this regard, our results differ from those
in [23]. Multiple high degree nodes are likely using several
hosting providers, increasing the attack’s cost. Second, even
with a lower budget requirement, our DoS attack targeted at
entities yields a similar adversary’s advantage as in [23] for all
the metrics when only considering one entity with 26 nodes.
7.4 Lightning Entities Across Paths
In this section, we study to what degree the security and
privacy of individual payments between any two nodes in the
LN are affected by our clustered entities. In the LN, a payment
between two nodes is typically routed through the cheapest
path between them, where the cost associated to the path is
calculated by the sum of fees charged by each intermediary
node. An intermediary node charges a fee composed of a rate
fee proportional to the payment amount, and a base fee that
is independent. We computed the cheapest paths between all
node pairs for a varying payment amount. This allows us to
study the following properties, that are visualized in Figure 5.
Value privacy. The payment value is observed by every sin-
gle intermediary in the path. Thus, according to our results,
a reduced number of entities know how many coins are be-
ing transferred in the LN, giving them undue advantage over
competitors (e.g., to set the fees or target products to users
accordingly). Being an intermediary also has a second impli-
cation, from a security point of view: a payment between any
two nodes can be aborted by a single intermediary node that
simply drops it. A few entities can thus stop between 25%
and 40% of the payments in the LN, and this fraction grows
significantly if multiple entities were to collude. Given the
decentralized payment protocol used currently in the LN, it
is not possible for the sender to pinpoint which intermediary
node has stopped the payment. Therefore the sender needs
to blindly guess what node is the malicious one and possibly
pay higher fees to circumvent it.
7.5 Lightning Entities Within a Path
From the results in the previous section, we observe that a
few entities are frequently intermediary nodes for many paths
used for payments in the LN. In this section, we are interested
in studying whether a single entity has more than one node
as an intermediary in a single path. This setting has further
security and privacy implications in practice.
Relationship anonymity. Assume a path where an entity
has two nodes, one of which is the immediate successor of
the sender and the other is the immediate predecessor of the
receiver. In such a setting, the fact that information uniquely
identifying a payment is sent across the path (e.g., a hash
value used to cryptographically secure the payment), allows
the entity to learn the sender and receiver for such payment,
even when other simultaneous payments may be using part of
the path. This privacy attack breaks the notion of relationship
anonymity as described in [13].
We evaluated the presence of such a threat in the Lightning
Network with the results shown in Figure 5. We observe that
there are between 5% and 20% of the paths prone to this
privacy issue even when as little as one entity behaves adver-
sarial. The reason why relationship anonymity is much more
vulnerable for higher payment amounts is straightforward:
Only a few channels have sufficient capacity, and several of
them are operated by the same entity (i.e. LNBig.com), forc-
ing more payments to go through them.
Wormhole attack. Assume now a path where an entity has
two intermediary nodes at any position in the path with the
condition that there are other honest nodes between them. The
latter are at risk of becoming a victim of the wormhole attack
as described in [14]. They are tricked into locking capacity at
their channels to facilitate the payment but never contacted
again to release those funds so that channels get locked for a
certain timeout period established as system parameter which
is on the order of days in the current implementation. While
similar in spirit to the griefing attack, the wormhole attack
differs in two main points: (i) the attacker entity does not
need to be the sender and receiver of the payment; and (ii) the
attacker entity can successfully settle the payment at the chan-
nels in the path other than those being attacked (i.e., channels
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Figure 5: Fraction of cheapest paths without value privacy and
relationship anonymity by different amounts to be transferred.
between two nodes of the attacker), so that the attacker also
gets the fees for providing an apparently successful payment
at the eyes of the sender and the receiver.
As shown in Figure 6, surprisingly the entity with the high-
est impact in this attack is not LNBIG.com as in the previous
attacks. In this case, the entity associated to rompert.com can
perform the wormhole attack for about 0.5% of all cheapest
paths in the LN. While this number is lower than in previous
attacks, the effect of this attack actively disrupts users in the
path (i.e., their coins get locked), different to privacy-based
attacks where the payment finishes successfully and the pri-
vacy breach is computed locally and passively at the attacker
node.
7.6 The Good and the Bad for Routing in LN
The possibility of deanonymization, which opens up with the
cluster and linking algorithms proposed in this work, has the
following implications arising from the security and privacy
issues in the routing of payments discussed so far.
Honest users can use the knowledge about entities to search
for payment paths that avoid them. However, this may not al-
ways be possible, especially for users who control a node with
only a few channels. In addition, alternative paths circumvent-
ing these entities may be more expensive, which represents a
trade-off between security/privacy and transaction fees.
On the other hand, the fact that honest users can learn about
entities and avoid them may have a negative impact on the
business model of these entities. The business incentive for
the LN nodes is to offer many channels and to set their fees so
that as many payments as possible are routed through them.
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Figure 6: Cheapest paths prone to the wormhole attack.
More payments are also associated with higher revenue poten-
tial. From this point of view, the deanonymization techniques
presented in this work are not beneficial for routing entities.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented two novel linking algorithms to
reveal the ownership of Bitcoin addresses that are controlled
by LN nodes using publicly-available data. We also developed
four Bitcoin address clustering algorithms and one LN node
clustering algorithm that allowed us to link 26.3% of the
addresses in our dataset to 43.7% of the public nodes, and
cluster 589 Lightning nodes into 233 entities. Finally, we
evaluated the security and privacy implications of our findings
in the LN, where we find that a single entity controls 36% of
the overall capacity and a few entities have a large impact on
value privacy and payment relationship anonymity. These few
entities also have a large overlap with those entities that would
be candidates for high-impact attacks, the success of which
can have significant negative effects on payment success and
throughput for the entire Lightning network. With the new
knowledge at hand, users can make better privacy and routing
decisions.
Scalability issues appear in a broad range of blockchain
applications and layer-2 protocols are increasingly considered
as possible solutions. In light of these developments, we find
an interesting venue for future work to evaluate whether our
heuristics apply to layer-2 protocols other than Lightning
Network such as the Raiden Network for Ethereum.
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A On-Chain Bitcoin Entity Clustering
In Figure 7, we depict an illustrative example of the patterns
that we use to cluster Bitcoin entities. Following the same
notation of Figure 1, the star pattern clusters the entities e1,
e2, e3 and e4 into one entity, the snake pattern clusters the
entities e1, e2 and e3 into one entity, the collector and the
proxy pattern cluster the entites e1, e2, e3 and e4 into one
entity.
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Figure 7: On-chain clustering heuristics. In the star patter, a
source entity replenish different funding entities that can be
clustered together. In the snake pattern, a series of funding
transactions are performed using the change address of a pre-
vious funding transaction as input and these funding entities
can be clustered. In the collector and proxy pattern, multple
settlmenet entities merge their coins in one single entity and
these settlement entities can be clustered.
B Evaluation of Different String Distance
Measures
As illustrated in Figure 8, we compare the string measures lcs
(longest common substring), Jaro, Jaro-Winkler, Levenshtein,
Damerau-Levensthein and Hamming distance. For those dis-
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Figure 8: Comparison of string distance measures for alias
clustering. The relative longest common substring (lcs) mea-
sure performs best. It grouped 314 Lightning nodes into 115
clusters. The threshold of 0.46 implies that for two aliases to
be clustered, their longest common substring needs to account
for about half of the longer alias.
tances where the result is not already between 0 and 1, we
normalize the distance by dividing by the longer one of the
two aliases to be compared.
For example, a popular string edit distance, the Levensthein
distance, measures the minimum number of single character
edits that are needed to transform one string into another.
Here an edit, refers to replacement, insertion or deletion. For
a detailed overview on text similarity approches we refer the
reader to [4].
The results indicate that several normalized string distances
exhibit similar performance, while the relative longest com-
mon substring yields the best performance. The optimal
threshold of 0.46 can be interpreted as follows: if a com-
mon substring is identified between two aliases, it needs to
account for about half of the length of the longer alias. A
practical similarity comparison is illustrated in Figure 9. We
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Figure 9: Example of a dendrogram illustrating alias similar-
ity. Here, the relative lcs distance metric has been used along
with the optimal threshold of 0.46 (red vertical dashed line).
As a result, 3 clusters are found. However, only in the LNBig
clusters, all nodes are hosted on the same AS. In addition, two
nodes behind these aliases appear in both clusters. Therefore,
in this example, they are merged and one LNBig.com cluster
is the result.
have chosen a subset of aliases that contains all observed
aliases of LNBig.com, multiple nodes containing the sub-
string textitLightning, and some randomly selected alises. At
the threshold, 3 clusters are identified. In two of them, all
nodes are hosted on the same AS. So the inital result would be
2 identified clusters. As the cluster consisting of LNBIG.com
[lnd-27/old-lnd-19] and LNBIG.com [lnd-28/old-lnd-22] are
just additional aliases that have been seen over time, but ac-
tually belong to some of the same public keys of the other
LNBig cluster, the two clusters are joined.
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